Synced Passkeys: Cloud Convenience That Reintroduces Account Recovery Risk

Background: what passkeys are and why synced ones matter

Passkeys (FIDO/WebAuthn credentials) are cryptographic credentials bound to a user’s device or authenticator that are designed to replace passwords and resist phishing. They eliminate shared secrets: instead of typing a password, a relying party verifies a public key presented by the user’s authenticator after local user verification (PIN, biometric, or device PIN).

To improve cross-device convenience, large vendors introduced “synced passkeys” — encrypted backups of platform or roaming passkeys stored in a user’s cloud account (for example, in a password manager or cloud keychain) so users can sign in from new devices without re-registering each relying party. That convenience is attractive for consumers and enterprises seeking to reduce support friction and password reset calls.

How synced passkeys inherit cloud-account and recovery risks

Synced passkeys trade some of the phishing and credential-guessing resilience of device-bound authenticators for availability through a cloud backup. That backup is only as secure as the cloud account and the recovery mechanisms that protect it.

• Cloud account compromise: if an attacker gains access to the underlying cloud account (email provider, identity provider, or password manager account) that stores encrypted passkeys, they may be able to trigger restoration of those passkeys to an attacker-controlled device or exploit recovery flows to obtain account access.
• Recovery processes: recovery and account-reset mechanisms — designed to help legitimate users regain access — can be targeted by attackers. Recovery often relies on secondary channels (email, phone, help-desk procedures) that are historically weaker than the cryptographic strength of passkeys themselves.
• Centralization risk: central storage concentrates authentication material. Whereas a device-tied passkey requires physical access or device compromise, a synced passkey expands the attack surface to include cloud credentials, account recovery workflows, and the security posture of the provider.

TLDR: If your organization is evaluating passkey deployments, it is insecure to deploy synced passkeys. Synced passkeys inherit the risk of the cloud accounts and recovery processes that protect them, which creates material enterprise exposure. AiTM kits can force authentication fallbacks that circumvent strong protections.

How attackers exploit synced passkeys — attack patterns to watch

The core attack model leverages the weakest link: instead of directly breaking cryptography, adversaries exploit the channels that enable passkey sync and recovery.

• Adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) phishing/proxy: AiTM frameworks and phishing proxies can intercept web authentication flows and manipulate the interaction between user and relying party. In some cases those tools can trigger fallback authentication or account recovery paths that do not require the original passkey material.
• Cloud account takeovers: once an attacker controls the cloud account associated with passkey sync, they can initiate device enrollments or restore credentials to a controlled endpoint. This bypasses the need to phish per-site credentials because the cloud-hosted passkey will impersonate the user to relying parties.
• Social engineering against recovery: attackers frequently leverage social engineering against help desks, or compromise secondary recovery channels (phone numbers, alternate email) to reset or redirect account controls and gain access to synced artifacts.

These pathways do not require breaking FIDO cryptography — they exploit operational and procedural weaknesses around synchronization and recovery.

Expert analysis and implications for enterprises

From a risk management perspective, passkeys are a major step forward when implemented as device-bound, attested credentials. The security gains are undermined when synchronization and recovery introduce new trust boundaries. Organizations should treat synced passkeys as a distinct threat model rather than a simple extension of passkey protections.

• Threat model shift: with synced passkeys the attacker’s target shifts from individual devices to cloud identity controls and recovery processes. Security controls must shift accordingly.
• Visibility and control: enterprises lose telemetry and control when passkeys live in third-party cloud stores under end-user accounts. Managed authenticators and enterprise-controlled key material provide stronger policy enforcement and incident visibility.
• User experience vs. security tradeoff: cloud sync improves usability and lowers help-desk burden, but it increases enterprise exposure. Each organization must weigh the operational benefits against the expanded threat surface.

Practical recommendations for practitioners

The following recommendations prioritize minimizing enterprise exposure while preserving the security benefits of passkeys. They are actionable controls that teams can evaluate and implement now.

• Prefer hardware- or device-bound authenticators for high-risk and privileged accounts. Encourage or require hardware security keys (FIDO2 tokens) or platform authenticators that are not synced to cloud backups for administrative and sensitive roles.
• Avoid enabling synced passkeys for enterprise accounts by policy. Where vendor controls exist, disable cloud synchronization for corporate-managed identities; require passkeys to be resident on a managed device or enterprise-issued hardware authenticator.
• Harden cloud accounts that provide synchronization. Where synced passkeys are allowed for non-sensitive use, enforce strong protections on the underlying cloud accounts: mandatory multi-factor authentication with attested authenticators (not SMS), strict recovery policies, and phishing-resistant second factors.
• Lock down recovery processes: review and harden help-desk procedures, implement verification requirements that resist social engineering, log and alert on recovery requests, and require additional approvals for recovery of privileged accounts.
• Use enterprise FIDO management and attestation. Deploy attestation-based onboarding to ensure authenticators meet policy, and use enterprise-managed resident credentials where available to maintain control of key material lifecycle.
• Monitor for AiTM indicators: instrument web applications for unusual redirect or proxy patterns, multiple failed WebAuthn attempts followed by fallback authentications, and abnormal device enrollment activity. Integrate these signals into identity and endpoint detection tooling.
• Educate users: explain the trade-offs of device-bound vs. synced passkeys, and provide clear guidance for high-risk use cases (e.g., do not sync passkeys for administrator accounts or access to sensitive systems).
• Plan incident response for cloud account compromise: ensure processes exist to quickly revoke synchronized credentials, disable cloud sync, and invalidate affected device registrations across relying parties.

Comparable cases and context

Major platform vendors rolled out passkey sync features to improve user experience; that adoption reflects a broader industry move away from passwords. At the same time, account-recovery and cloud-account takeovers remain a well-documented vector in investigations and breach postmortems. Security teams have long treated recovery processes and secondary channels as high-risk control points, and synced passkeys inherit that same risk profile.

Historical incident patterns — including social engineering of support staff, SIM-swapping, and unauthorized access to cloud accounts — illustrate the practical avenues attackers use to bypass strong primary authentication when fallback or recovery options exist. These operational lessons apply directly to synced passkeys: convenience-focused features must be reconciled with hardened recovery and cloud-account controls to preserve overall security gains.

Conclusion

Passkeys represent a significant security improvement over passwords when they remain bound to authenticators protected by local user verification or hardware tokens. Synced passkeys reintroduce systemic risk by placing recovery and account-security controls at the center of the trust model. For enterprises, the prudent path is to treat synced passkeys as an operational hazard: avoid cloud-synced credentials for privileged accounts, deploy managed or hardware-bound authenticators, harden cloud account protections and recovery flows, and instrument detection for AiTM and account-takeover patterns. Convenience should not be adopted at the cost of replacing a single point of cryptographic failure with a concentrated operational one.

Source: thehackernews.com